After a landslide victory, the Democratic Party came to power in May 1950 with the support of an Islamic (Sunni-Orthodox) reaction to secularism and the agrarian majority (see Table II.4.4.). In June 1950, the Democratic majority cancelled the article of the Penal Code prohibiting the Arabic Ezan (call for prayer, five times a day); in effect, ending the Turkish Ezan, which had been practiced since 1928. The rationale was that republican Governments had misconstrued ‘secularism’ as a restriction of the “free exercise of religion”. In November of the same year, religious courses were included in the school curricula. The requirement for parental request or consent was changed to a requirement for rejection. Parents who did not want their children take religion might apply for an exemption. In 1953, compulsory religion courses were added to the ninth and tenth grade of primary teacher schools. In 1954, Village Institutes were incorporated to the Primary Teachers Schools. In 195657, religion (Islam) and ethics courses were reintroduced to middle schools and in 1966-67, the same courses were extended to lycees, on elective bases. Parents had to tell the school whether they wanted it or not. In 1959, Higher Islamic Institutes were established.

    According to the free-lance writer Peyami Safa, transition from the republican to democratic Turkey could be seen, in retrospect, as either a counter-revolution or a democratic restoration of Islam, eventually leading to the Turk-Islam Synthesis of the 1980's. After having defended the Turkish Revolution from Gokalp's (1924)

   Foundations of Nationalism to Democrats' victory in 1950, Safa had, in the Democratic 50's, turned against it in his "East-West Synthesis" (published 1962). He felt accountable for this change of heart:

    Safa was now questioning and criticizing the "historical and philosophical foundations" of the Turkish Revolution, which he had heartily approved in 30's. Here is a sample of the arguments put forward by him:

• No progress is possible without some sense of history,

• Denial of the past may be disastrous for national life,
• Nationhood is impossible without dissenting philosophers,

• Transition to pluralism is the true criterion of revolutions,

• Literacy should be functional (ie, serve a useful purpose).

    Lack of philosophy was an Ottoman legacy, which could not be blamed on the Republic alone. First Gokalp and later the writer Erisirgil agreed that freedom of enquiry was a prerequisite of any philosophical venture. If natural science were tolerated then philosophy would follow. After relevant and valid observations as above, Safa committed himself to the Democrat Party's political platform:

• After 35 years, we are neither industrialized nor modernized
• Secularism cannot be a prerequisite to modernisation
• There is no conflict between science (ilim) and religion
• There is no civilization which is not based on religion
• The Turkish Revolution had no book and republicans have no faith
• Revolutions from top down lack the support of popular wisdom
• Turkish Revolution is not the work of a single leader [ie, Atatürk].

    This has been the viable manifesto of popular (Muslim) rebellion against secularism in Turkey. Pointblank, clear enough but not fair! Except for Japan perhaps, no nation starting from scratch has become industrialized in only one or two generations. Without secularization, would not the Turkish Revolution reduce itself to an Anachronistic Tanzimat? The vital question of revolution was not ideology but survival. To Atatürk, the best defense against western imperialism was western civilization itself. There has always been an unresolved conflict between religion based on dogma and faith and science based on doubt and enquiry.

    The real issues, however, behind the Islamic resurgence were rather different. Although Turkish secularism guaranteed full freedom of belief, conscience and conviction, the legal divorce from a powerful state machinery was an open blow -if not an offense- to Islam. For, Islam was both state and politics par excellence and without the state organizations backing and the support of Vaqf revenues, Islam was lame or crippled. Turkish Islam as elsewhere has been trying to regain this power, a power that it utilized until the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Islamists, as democratic representatives of the nation, were now in the parliament, which proclaimed “The sovereignty belongs to nation”. Thus, in this long prelude, the democratic restoration of Islam had began and made some headway.